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ABSTRACT 
This Article is set in the background of the consequences of the 
WTO’s prescriptions on patenting of life-saving medications which has 
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largely contributed to the morphing of patents on life-saving medication 
into a luxury. Remarkably, there has been a transformation of the role of 
patents in the context of pharmaceutical innovation into a strategic 
business tool leading to a larger interest in creation and sustenance of 
regulatory rights. The biggest global development in this area is an 
increased effort to strengthen exclusivity using regulatory protections for 
all chemicals, and even, biologics, involved in all stages of drug 
development. Consequently, pharmaceutical companies have expertly 
navigated this confluence of patents with regulatory data protection to 
leverage themselves in a manner effectively creating high protection and 
financial rewards for what materials that could otherwise be susceptible 
for generic competition. This Article concerns itself with the regulatory 
regime that effectively provides for exclusivity of clinical trial data. The 
focus of the Article will be on how and why data exclusivity works for the 
pharmaceutical industry to promote and/or protect market exclusivity 
globally. Thus, the Article examines what data exclusivity is, the 
international trade obligations relating to providing data exclusivity, and 
the impact of the data exclusivity obligations on access to medication 
issues, with a specific focus on developing countries while keeping the 
U.S. regime as the vantage point to examine these issues. The Article 
outlines how the data exclusivity regime can operate in parallel with the 
patent regime to add a layer of protection for the data, thus adding to the 
protection regime for chemical or biologic data. In doing so, this Article 
will address some of the more controversial issues that have arisen 
globally with reference to data exclusivity within the larger access to 
medication debate. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The year 2017 marks another step closer to the 25th anniversary of 
the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO).1 In the area 
of intellectual property rights, particularly patents, one significant 
phenomenon of the first quarter-century of the establishment of the WTO 
is the morphing of patents on life-saving medication into a luxury. The 
WTO’s global patent prescription largely helped establish economic 
* Srividhya Ragavan is a Professor of Law at the Texas A&M University School of Law specializing 
in international trade and intellectual property issues. The author wishes to extend thanks and 
appreciation to Ms. Priyanka Sunjay, National Law University, Jodhpur, India for providing excellent 
research for this Article.  
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154; see also The WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm [https://perma.cc/7QKV-KYAU].  
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status as the marker distinguishing those that can access life-saving 
medication from the rest of the population. Consequently, this decade 
witnessed an elevated interest over the role of patents in the context of 
pharmaceutical innovation. While patents continued to be an important 
strategic business tool, there was a slow but a steady downgrading of 
patents from its touted original position of being the unique economic 
prescription to promote innovation. As such, the rhetoric of innovation, 
which long served as a platform to nestle “patents,” was being challenged 
in many industries and in many countries. From the United Statesthe 
traditional flag-holder touting the benefits of patentsto developing 
countries such as Indiawhich is a relatively newer graduate of the trade 
regime2the role of patents have come up for scrutiny. People generally 
perceived patents, however unfairly, as the woe affecting pricing and thus 
thwarting access to life-saving medication. While pricing was one of the 
several questions that resulted in the permeation of pharmaceutical pricing 
as an election issue in the United States, globally, pricing as well as other 
policies became the subject of a larger access to medication debate.3 
In the United States, the Supreme Court’s decision highlighting the 
low thresholds of biotechnology patents came at a time when academic 
focus underscored how secondary patents potentially blocked 
downstream innovations.4 At a global level, international organizations 
2. See, e.g., Srividhya Ragavan, Of the Inequals of Uruguay, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 274 (2006) (detailing India’s process patent regime and its graduation into the TRIPS patent 
regime).  
3. In 2016, as the debate on the price of pharmaceuticals became one of the important election 
issues in the United States, other issues that contribute to such an increase in price, such as patents, 
came into the limelight. For example, in January of 2016, the U.S. News reported that 50 Democratic 
members of the House, led by Rep. Lloyd Doggett, D-Texas, urged government agencies to consider 
diluting or diminishing the exclusive rights over patents on pharmaceuticals. See Kimberly Leonard, 
Can the Government Already Control Drug Prices, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 11, 2016), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016/01/11/congressional-democrats-urge-nih-to-act-on-
drug-prices. Similarly, in 2016, Senator Bernie Sanders and Representative Elijah Cummings sought 
more information about the price increases for Iclusig, a drug used to treat chronic myeloid leukemia 
which was priced at $199,000 for a year’s worth of treatment. See Sanders, Cummings Send Letter on 
ARIAD’s Staggering Price Increases, (Oct. 20, 2016), 
https://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/sanders-cummings-send-letter-on-ariads-
staggering-price-increases [https://perma.cc/CBY3-VJKG]. 
4. See, e.g., Thomas Faunce & Joel Lexchin, ‘Linkage’ Pharmaceutical Evergreening in
Canada and Australia, AUSTL. AND N. Z. HEALTH POL’Y (Biomed Central) (June 1, 2007); see also 
Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park & Bhaven Sampat, Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An 
Empirical Analysis of “Secondary” Pharmaceutical Patents, PLOS ONE (Dec. 5, 2012), 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0049470&type=printable 
[https://perma.cc/5VBM-FLDL]; Amy Kapczynski, Engineered in India: Patent Law 2.0, 8 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 497, 497-99 (Aug. 8, 2013); Scott Hemphill & Bhaven Sampat, When Do Generics 
Challenge Drug Patents?, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD., 613, 613-49 (2011); Scott Hemphill & Bhaven 
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affirmatively asserted that patents had transformed into a barrier to 
promote global access to medication.5 Further, nationally as well as 
globally there was a marked increase in active participation by non-
governmental organizations as well as the public. For example, in 
September 2017, a protest against the 1,157% price-increase by Eli Lilly 
on diabetes drugs such as Humalog, whose patent had expired 75 years 
ago, made the headlines, prompting protests outside the Eli Lilly 
headquarters.6 Overall, the effort to ensure accessibility and affordability 
of pharmaceuticals resulted in the focus on patents broadening to an 
extended consideration of related tools such as pricing, regulatory details, 
innovation, and more. Consequently, on the one hand, the pharmaceutical 
industry assumed a defensive posture denouncing reduction in patent 
exclusivity as stifling innovation; on the other hand, the pharmaceutical 
industry scrambled for tools and strategies to consolidate its exclusivity. 
This Article will examine one such tool, being data exclusivity, 
which has traditionally helped the pharmaceutical industry consolidate its 
market exclusivity.7 The focus of the Article is on how and why data 
exclusivity works for the pharmaceutical industry to promote and/or 
protect market exclusivity globally. Thus, the Article examines what data 
Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. 
HEALTH ECON. 327, 327-39 (2012). 
5. See The United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel Report on Access to 
Medicines Report, UNITED NATIONS (Sept. 2016), http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report/ 
[https://perma.cc/JH7Y-CMZH] [hereinafter Report of United Nations]. A similar report issued by 
the World Health Organization (WHO) relating to Hepatitis C treatment in lower income countries 
highlighted a series of strategies involving generic medicines, licensing models, local production, and 
differential pricing as being critical to enable lifesaving; see also Over 1 Million Treated with Highly 
Effective Hepatitis C Medicines, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 27, 2016), 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2016/hepatitis-c-medicines/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/96LN-ZTCM]. This report highlights that “[l]icensing agreements and local 
production in some countries have gone a long way to make these treatments more affordable.” Dr 
Suzanne Hill, WHO Director for Essential Medicines and Health Products, has asserted the 
importance of local production and pricing models to make medication accessible and affordable. Id. 
See also Ed Silverman, Hepatitis C Drugs Remain Unaffordable in many Countries, PHARMALOT 
(May 31, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/05/31/gilead-hepatitis-drug-prices-who/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z2A4-ABA7]. See generally Development Agenda for WIPO, WORLD INTELL. 
PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/ [https://perma.cc/QA7Y-GDLV] (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2018). 
6. The Indianapolis Business Journal reported that over the past 20 years, while the price of
a gallon of milk climbed 23% and the sticker on a Dodge Caravan minivan rose 21%, the list price of 
the insulin Humalog, made by Eli Lilly and Co., shot up 1,157%. Lilly’s other insulin, Humulin, on 
the market since 1982, saw a price increase totaling nearly 800% over the last two decades. John 
Russel, Lilly Insulin Prices Come Under Microscope, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J. (Aug. 26, 2017), 
https://www.ibj.com/articles/65163-lilly-insulin-prices-come-under-microscope?utm_source=this-
week-in-ibj&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_campaign=2017-08-26 [https://perma.cc/K4F5-L8C5]. 
7. See infra Section III, for definition of the terms.
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exclusivity is, the international trade obligations relating to providing data 
exclusivity, and the impact of the data exclusivity obligations on access 
to medication issues with a specific focus on developing countries while 
keeping the U.S. regime as the vantage point to examine the issues. In 
doing so, this Article will address some of the more controversial issues 
that have arisen globally with reference to data exclusivity, within the 
larger access to medication debate. The Article’s initial discussion on data 
exclusivity, in Section II, is followed by an outline in Section III of the 
historic origins of data exclusivity. Section IV provides a description of 
Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement8 and its requirements. Section V 
addresses some of the recent questions from developing countries relating 
to the global prescriptions in the TRIPS Agreement and its translations 
into national policy specifically focusing on India as an example. The 
conclusion highlights the need to be cautious in establishing data 
exclusivity regimes. 
II. DATA EXCLUSIVITY: DEFINITION & DEBATE
In order to appreciate why data exclusivity has become an important 
tool to promote or protect market exclusivity, it is important to understand 
what it is and how it operates. Thus, at the outset, this section outlines and 
defines data exclusivity. Then, it highlights the role of the data with 
reference to the pharmaceutical regulatory process. In doing so, this 
section displays how the data protection regime operates alongside 
patents. In all, this section provides the set-up for a discussion in the next 
section on how data exclusivity operates to sustain/create market 
monopoly, which, in turn, affects everyday access to medication for 
people. 
In simple terms, data exclusivity operates to provide protection of 
data first submitted to a drug regulator to prove a chemical’s therapeutic 
efficacy. The term “data exclusivity” refers to statutory provisions that 
protect clinical trial data in such a manner that it results in prohibition of 
reliance over the submitted data towards approval or submission of 
abbreviated applications for generic versions. That is, data exclusivity 
essentially treats the data of a drug generated in the course of clinical trials 
submitted to marketing approval agencies, typically, government 
regulatory agencies, as exclusive to the organization/corporation that 
8. See Text of Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), reprinted in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 365 (1995) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
5
Ragavan: Data Exclusivity
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
1168 AKRON LAW REVIEW [51:1163 
conducted the clinical trial.9 In essence, for pharmaceuticals, data 
exclusivity protects the information relating to clinical trial results data. 
For example, if Drug A, whose patent is owned by innovator drug 
company AMBA Inc., is effective against say, psoriasis, but results in 
arthritis pain in patients, clinical trials over Drug A will show a pattern of 
cure and of side effects. The data from the clinical trial will be essential 
for national regulatory agencies, such as the Food and Drug 
Administration in the United States, to clear the drug for marketing after 
considering its safety. 
It is common for most governments to regulate the marketing of 
pharmaceutical and agricultural products to ensure that they are safe and 
effective. Most governments seek assurances about the safety of the drug 
from the manufacturer. Developed nations tend to get more opportunities 
to test the evidence of safety and effectiveness as part of the marketing 
approval process, essentially because they are typically the markets where 
new drugs are first launched. Each country can seek a different type or 
amount of evidence of safety and efficacy. Some countries (e.g., the 
United States, European Community, and Japan) statutorily require the 
submission of an extensive amount of data to prove the safety of drugs, 
even if the product was approved by another government.10 Thus, 
globally, all regulatory agencies will require drugs to undergo data testing 
before it is approved. Before a drug can be approved for marketing, the 
drugs are required to undergo detailed clinical testing to ensure it is safe 
and efficacious. Such testing is more rigorous for New Chemical Entities 
(NCEs) to ensure its safety.11 
Innovator pharmaceutical companies have been successful in 
asserting that the clinical trial data generated needs to be exclusive to the 
company that conducts the clinical trial.  Pharmaceutical companies assert 
that such exclusivity of the data allows the drug company to recoup the 
investment on clinical trials, which can run up to four separate phases 
involving several patients, their confidential information, treatment 
9. But see Erika Lietzan, The Myth of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 91, 110, 
118 (2016) (asserting that data exclusivity “is not a grant of anything to anyone” and that, from a 
regulatory perspective, “a subsequent entrant may file full applications for copies or near copies”). 
But, the article does not discuss the effect on consumers but creates a definitional distinction without 
fully exploring the practical real-life impact. 
10. G. Lee Skillington & Eric M. Solovy, The Protection of Test and Other Data Required by 
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, 24 Nw. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 6 (2003).  
11. A new chemical entity (NCE) is, according to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, a
drug that contains no active moiety that has been approved by the FDA in any other application 
submitted under section 505(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a) 
(2016).  
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regimen, and information on side effects and safety regimes of the 
medication.12 It is a fact that the cost of undertaking the tests is 
considerable, involves human subjects, and can therefore be an arduous 
exercise. That said, the return for the risk of investing in creating new 
chemicals/compounds/drugs is a patent that gives a market monopoly for 
20 years.13 Arguably, the test data highlighting the efficacy of a chemical 
need not be rewarded separately, especially if the monopoly for being the 
reward detrimentally affects access to medication for two reasons. First, 
the patent statute provides a 20-year exclusivity for new pharmaceutical 
innovations;14 second, independent Drug Information Journals repeatedly 
assert that the rate of “truly innovative” new medicines ranges as low as 
approximately 2–3%.15 
In practice, a vast majority of so-called “new medicines,” including 
those that are currently benefitting from patent protection, typically 
represent minor improvements over existing standards.16 Considering 
this, data protection works as a mechanism to add a layer of a different 
type of market protection. In effect, data exclusivity operates to provide a 
layer of protection in addition to patent protection for the data gathered by 
innovator drug companies. Needless to specify, just like patents, data 
12. Kristina Lybecker, When Patents Aren’t Enough: The Case for Data Exclusivity for
Biologic Medicines, IP WATCHDOG (July 9, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/07/09/patents-
arent-enough-data-exclusivity-for-biologic-medicines/id=50318/ [https://perma.cc/Q7PN-43BX]. 
See also Trudo Lemmens & Shannon Gibson, Decreasing The Data Deficit: Improving Postmarket 
Surveillance In Pharmaceutical Regulation, 59 MCGILL L. J. 943 (2014) (arguing that drug regulation 
would benefit from less industry control and highlighting how historically grown drug regulations 
have contributed to the development of industry control over clinical trials, which is one of the key 
factors behind the limits of pre-market evidence). 
13. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1952).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Brian Godman et al., Are new Models Needed to Optimize the Utilization of new 
Medicines to Sustain Healthcare Systems?, 8 EXPERT REV. OF CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 77, 79 
(2015) http://dx.doi.org/10.1586/17512433.2015.990380 [https://perma.cc/V94N-ELVP] 
(“Prescrire, a critical independent drug information journal, believed only 2% of new medicines or 
new indications for existing medicines in France were innovative and/or offered a real therapeutic 
advantage over existing treatments despite the hype.”).  
16. See New drugs, new indications in 2015: little progress, and threats to access to quality 
healthcare for all, 36 REV. PRESCRIRE 136 (2016) 
english.prescrire.org/en/3D3B93E1C3DE20A599FBA073C5442463/Download.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/2M98-663R]; see also Prescrire Editorial Staff, New Products and new Indications 
in 2016: a System that Favours Imitation over the Pursuit of real Progress, 37 REV. PRESCRIRE 136 
(2017) english.prescrire.org/en/955912A2E87C92B676874FA2C1354846/Download.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/84EN-FKNV] [hereinafter New Products, 2016] (“Little therapeutic progress was 
made in 2016, yet many medicines with no clinical value, uncertain efficacy or an unfavourable harm-
benefit balance were authorized. This is due at least in part to the current system that drives 
pharmaceutical research and development. The primary focus is neither on patients’ needs nor on 
delivering genuine therapeutic advances at affordable prices.”).  
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exclusivity has come to represent an important tool for innovator 
companies to preserve market exclusivity to help keep the price of the 
pharmaceutical product high. Thus, in this Article, the term “market 
exclusivity” refers to the exclusive status that a drug enjoys because of 
data protection irrespective of whether the drug benefits from patent or 
any other form of protection. In other words, by protecting clinical trial 
data over a drug, the chemical components of which may even be in the 
public domain, the resulting exclusivity that the company enjoys in the 
market is termed as market exclusivity. 
In the U.S., schemes such as orphan drug exclusivity and pediatric 
drug exclusivity are both examples of regulatory schemes that provide a 
new lease of “market” exclusivity by precluding submission or approval 
of any competing application even though the chemical in the drug may 
have been known and used for several years in the United States. In effect, 
this Article asserts that data exclusivity creates market exclusivity thus 
preventing competing applications that can benefit the consumers and 
lower the cost of the medication.17 
III. HISTORIC ORIGIN & INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF DATA
EXCLUSIVITY 
The following section outlines two important aspects. First, it 
outlines the historic origins of the data exclusivity regime. Appreciating 
the historic origins of this regime is critical to appreciate the role of data 
protection to determine whether and how data protection can, from an 
economic, political, and trade perspective, serve national interests. 
Second, it elaborates on the international obligations outlined under 
Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement to appreciate the breadth, limits, and 
built-in flexibilities of the international obligation that governs this 
regime. 
Historically, data exclusivity evolved from unfair competition 
principles. Over a period, the concept of data exclusivity, while grounded 
on unfair competition principles, evolved into a more sui generis form of 
an intellectual property right. The underlying rationale or justification is 
based on the principle that it is unfair if data collected at the expense of 
one party becomes available for use by other parties to gain unfair 
commercial advantage. 
17. Other writers have used the term “market exclusivity” to refer to prohibitions on
submission or approval of any competing application, even if supported by a full complement of 
original data. See, e.g., Lietzan, supra note 9.  
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Internationally, for the first time, unfair competition principles were 
captured as the basis for data exclusivity in Article 10bis of the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.18 The basic outline 
of Article 10bis is that it requires member countries to provide for 
“effective protection against unfair competition.”19 The Paris Convention 
defined the term “unfair competition” as “any act of competition contrary 
to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters.”20 As part of the 
protection against unfair competition, Article 10bis of the Paris 
Convention sought to: 1) establish “honest practices in industrial or 
commercial matters”; and 2) prevent actions such as dishonest 
manufacturing and other practices that mislead the public as to the nature 
and quality of the goods.21 
The establishment of the WTO22 resulted in the inclusion of 
intellectual property laws within the larger umbrella of trade. Thus, the 
TRIPS Agreement, which established minimum standards of intellectual 
property provisions, also incorporated the provisions of the Paris 
Convention.23 The entire Part 7 of the TRIPS Agreement, which includes 
Article 39, elaborates three types of protections “[i]n the course of 
ensuring effective protection against unfair competition.” These are: 1) 
protection against unfair competition as detailed in the Paris Convention; 
2) protection of “undisclosed information” as outlined in paragraph 2 of
Article 39; and 3) protection for “data submitted to governments or 
governmental agencies” as outlined in paragraph 3 of Article 39.24 The 
following discussion captures each of the different types of protections 
envisaged under Article 39 of TRIPS. 
A. Protection Against Unfair Competition 
The Paris Convention, from where the TRIPS provisions were 
imported, outlines three aspects as forming a part of the obligations of 
members to establish protection against unfair competition. Subsection 3 
of Article 10bis provides three specific examples of actions that represent 
unfair competition.25 They are: 1) action that creates confusion with 
18. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 at art. 10 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
19. Id.
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. See World Trade Organization, supra note 1. 
23. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, Art. 39(2). 
24. Id. at Art. 39(3). 
25. Paris Convention, supra note 18. 
9
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goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor; 2) false 
allegations in the course of trade that result in discrediting the goods, or 
the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor;26 and 3) 
misleading indications or allegations which misrepresent the nature, 
manufacturing process, characteristics, quality, or quantity of goods.27 
The three examples specifically outline activities that lead to an unfair 
commercial advantage. This provision forms the basis for the TRIPS 
provisions dealing with undisclosed information. Importantly, none of the 
listed examples in the Paris Convention make any reference to 
undisclosed information. Hence, it is arguable that undisclosed 
information, which is the crux of the TRIPS provisions, does not fall 
within the larger umbrella of the first requirement of the Paris Convention, 
being unfair competition. 
B. Protection of “Undisclosed Information” as Outlined in Paragraph 
2 of Article 39 
Article 39.2 of TRIPS relates to protection for undisclosed 
information, or, protection of trade secrets. In essence, it requires 
members to guarantee protection for any information that has commercial 
value which the owner lawfully controls and deems as a secret.28 This 
protection prevents unlawful disclosure by any means to ensure honesty 
in commercial transactions. Thus, any information, such as customer lists, 
internal manuals, parts information in factories, or such other information, 
can qualify for protection as long as the owner of the information believes 
that it has commercial value and maintains its secrecy. It is important to 
appreciate that TRIPS does not necessitate members to establish a trade 
secret statute (such as the state statutes in the United States which treat 
trade secrets as a form of property). It merely requires members to assure 
protection for undisclosed information.29 
A protection regime for undisclosed information may be structured 
using the law of contract or other areas of law, which continues to remain 
the norm in some member countries. Thus, breach of contract, breach of 
confidence, and unlawful or fraudulent acquisition of undisclosed 
information by third-parties can also form a part of the cause of action 
under Article 39.2. Historically, countries have differed widely on the 
26. Id. 
27. Id.
28. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at Art. 39(2). 
29. Id.; see also Overview: the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm [https://perma.cc/KT9L-JCNM]; TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 8.  
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subject of protection of trade secret laws. Many of the differences have 
been owed to the question of whether the country treats trade secrets as a 
form of property. For instance, most European countries do not conceive 
of trade secrets as property. In fact, trade secrets are not considered as a 
form of an exclusive intellectual property right. Thus, they are not subject 
to the EU Enforcement Directive.30 Instead, the EU Enforcement 
Directive provides for certain procedures and remedies to ensure that there 
is a sufficient and consistent level of civil redress in the internal market in 
the event of unlawful acquisition, use, or disclosure of a trade secret.31 It 
merely facilitates the investigation and pursuit of intellectual property 
claims within the Union. In any case, Article 39.2 does not necessitate or 
mandate data exclusivity provisions. This view is supported by Shamnad 
Basheer in his exhaustive treatment of Article 39 of TRIPS where he 
outlines that a number of developing countries have adopted the view that 
TRIPS does not mandate undisclosed information to be treated as property 
and does not require granting of exclusive rights to the owner of the data.32 
C. Protection for “Data Submitted to Governments or Governmental 
Agencies” as Outlined in Article 39.3 
Article 39.3 of TRIPS states the following: 
Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of 
pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new 
chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the 
origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such 
data against unfair commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect 
such data against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the pub-
lic, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against 
unfair commercial use.33 
Thus, Article 39.3 requires members to provide protection against the 
unfair commercial use or disclosure of undisclosed test or other data that: 
1) are submitted for the purposes of getting marketing approval for
pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products; and 2) involved the use 
30. Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016
on the Protection of Undisclosed know-how and Business Information (Trade Secrets) Against their 
Unlawful Acquisition, use and Disclosure, OFFICIAL J. OF THE EUR. UNION (May 15, 2016), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016L0943 [https://perma.cc/YHJ2-AP7N]. 
31. Id.
32. Shamnad Basheer, Protection of Regulatory Data Under Article 39.3 of TRIPS: The Indian 
Context (2006).  
33. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at Art. 39(3). 
11
Ragavan: Data Exclusivity
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
1174 AKRON LAW REVIEW [51:1163 
of new chemical entities, the origination of which involves considerable 
effort, except when the data is required to protect the public.34 
Data exclusivity relates to the second requirement in Article 39 of 
the TRIPS Agreement (or the third form, depending on how it is viewed) 
and relates to protection for data submitted to regulators, governments, or 
governmental agencies to get market approval. The submitted data is 
usually critical to prove the safety of the application material/drug. The 
details of such protection are outlined in paragraph 3 of Article 39 of 
TRIPS and relate solely to “the submission of undisclosed test or other 
data” made as part of the approval process for marketing of 
pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products which utilize new 
chemical entities.35 The protection is against unfair commercial use of 
“undisclosed test or other data” submitted to the FDA or the equivalent 
agencies provided it involves a considerable effort.36 The protection 
regime means to prevent the disclosure of the data and the unfair 
commercial use of the data. There is one exception though in Article 39.3, 
and that is where the data is deemed necessary to “protect the public.”37 
For example, assume Company A has Drug XYZ for the cure of acne 
for which it plans to apply for patent protection. During this time, the 
company conducts clinical trials of over 300 patients and determines that 
the drug is safe to be used to treat acne. After the clinical trial is concluded, 
Company A submits the clinical trial information as part of the approval 
for marketing the drug. The data from the clinical trial may reveal 
information about the properties of the drug. For example, it can show that 
the drug is more effective on adolescents who have had a history of 
asthma, or that the drug can cause dangerous side effects on adolescents 
who have had a history of, say, childhood diabetes. At this time, Company 
A has two specific approval processes in place. First is to get a patent on 
XYZ, and the next is to benefit from data protection for the clinical trial 
data collected about XYZ. These are two distinct, parallel processes and 
provide two layers of protection. First, Company A can get patent 
protection and benefit from the patent protection (which will allow the 
company to charge monopoly prices during the patent term) provided the 
drug clears the statutory requirements such as novelty and 
nonobviousness. Second, data exclusivity provisions result in protecting 
the data and preventing the use of the clinical trial information by a 
competitor during the data exclusivity term. The second layer of 
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 4, Art. 6
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss4/6
2017] DATA EXCLUSIVITY 1175 
protection is independent of patent protection provided it involved 
considerable effort in collecting the data. 
For innovator pharmaceuticals, protecting the clinical trial data 
provides an economic opportunity by creating a new market (thus, the 
definition of market exclusivity) on the information relating to safety of 
the drug. Thus, it helps provide market exclusivity for a compound that 
may even fail the scrutiny for protection under the patent statute.38 Critics 
point out correctly that pharmaceutical companies do prefer to make 
general trial information available at the earliest opportunity with a view 
to boost share prices. For example, with Drug XYZ, it would be common 
for Company A to highlight general trial information of the drug, such as 
that it can cure acne with very little side effects, without discussing severe 
side effects on segments of population, such as minors on asthma 
medication or children with diabetes.39 The general clinical trial 
information about drugs are increasing and proactively tracked among 
health authorities as well as venture capitalists for various market related 
reasons, such as determining potential funding models.40 Release of 
limited but early trial information can allow pharmaceutical companies to 
seek more funding for the launch of their new medicines. But, such 
general disclosures of pharmaceutical companies aimed at securing 
funding need to be carefully distinguished from data that bear critical 
patient information, including side effects and success details, which will 
remain protected under data protection laws. 
IV. COURSES OF ACTION FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The above discussion highlighted the historical origins, the 
prevailing form of data exclusivity, and some of the international as well 
as trade law questions involved with it, including the built-in flexibilities 
in Article 39 of TRIPS. The discussion below ventures into the question 
38. See definition of market exclusivity, supra Section II.
39. But see New Products, 2016, supra note 16, at note 2 (asserting how new products in the
year 2016 represented no or limited therapeutic advancement; further discussing how pharmaceuticals 
are approved applications without demanding adequate supporting data of clinical trials). 
40. There is an increasing level of pro-activity among health authorities in Europe to track new 
medicines early and feed this information into their potential funding models. See, e.g., Irene Eriksson 
et al., The Early Awareness and Alert System in Sweden: History and Current Status, 8 FRONTIERS 
IN PHARMACOLOGY 674 (Oct. 5, 2017), https://doi.org/10.3389/fphar.2017.00674  
[https://perma.cc/RCX4-7FKK]; see also Rickard Malmstrom et al., Dabigatran - A Case History 
Demonstrating the Need for Comprehensive Approaches to Optimize the Use of New Drugs, 4 
FRONTIERS IN PHARMACOLOGY 39 (May 14, 2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC3653065/ [https://perma.cc/X4HF-UDWP] (discussing example of activities 
between European countries to share data). 
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of the options developing countries have and how these options could 
affect these nations. In doing so, this section attempts to provide 
guidelines especially for developing countries that are considering 
adopting a regime of data exclusivity styled along the lines of what 
prevails in the United States. The section below outlines questions that 
arise from the built-in flexibilities of Article 39.3 and questions that arise 
when effectuating a data exclusivity regime in other countries. 
The most important element of Article 39 is the breadth. The rhetoric 
from innovative pharmaceutical companies, notwithstanding the broad 
prescription in Article 39.3, is meant to give WTO members the freedom 
to set their own rules in a flexible manner with a view to specifically 
facilitate members to interpret the Article’s principal terminology.41 Each 
element of the Article has built-in flexibilities that may be critical to 
achieve national objectives for developing countries. 
A. Defining “Undisclosed” Test Data 
Under Article 39.3, WTO Members have an obligation to protect 
undisclosed data against unfair commercial use. Typically, undisclosed 
data relates to clinical trial information disclosed to regulators but deemed 
undisclosed to third parties. The underlying rationale behind treating data 
disclosed to regulators as “undisclosed” is that innovator pharmaceutical 
companies invest money into generating safety details and data for new 
and innovative drugs or combinations.42 That is, Company A invests 
money by conducting clinical trials on the drug to determine its efficacy. 
If that data is allowed to be used by a second applicant for getting 
marketing approval for the same drug, in effect that regulatory practice 
gives an unfair commercial advantage to the second applicant in that the 
second applicant does not have to generate the data which was required 
of the first applicant and hence results in significant economic saving.43 
While this reasoning is cited to explain the rationale behind data 
41. Wael Armouti & Mohammad F.A. Nsour, Data Exclusivity for Pharmaceuticals: Was It
the Best Choice for Jordan Under the U.S.- Jordan Free Trade Agreement?, 17 OREGON REV. OF INT. 
L. 258, 260 (2016), https://law.uoregon.edu/images/uploads/entries/Nsour.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VDM5-466R]. 
42. Jacques Gorlin, Encouragement of New Clinical Drug Development: The Role of Data
Exclusivity, INT’L FED’N OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS ASS’N (IFPMA) (2000), 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/en/DataExclusivity_2000.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NN7E-UAMS].  
43. Id. at 15; Protection of Undisclosed Information and Control of Anti-Competitive 
Practices, APEC TRIPS Seminar: 17-19 May 1995, Presentation by New Zealand, 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/en/DataExclusivity_2000.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B7R3-P8YJ].  
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exclusivity, it is important to note that a competing generic applicant tends 
to price the drug much lower, thus, benefitting the consumer. Moreover, 
as mentioned earlier, conducting clinical trials is a part of the risk that 
innovator companies undertake in order to gain the enormous market 
benefits that come with patent protection. Generally, the first applicant 
typically seeks patent protection which, if successful, leads to monopoly 
profits during the statutory period of exclusivity meant to recoup 
“research and development.”44 While Article 39 necessitates protection of 
undisclosed data, the breadth of the language and lack of definition of the 
terms is in consideration of the fact that not all countries were convinced 
that patent protection would not adequately help recoup the cost of clinical 
trials.45 
B. “Undisclosed” to Whom? 
Article 39 necessitates protection of data disclosed to regulators and 
thus raises the question of whether the obligation to not disclose the data 
applies only against third parties or does it include the 
regulators/government officials of the members. The negotiating history 
of Article 39.3 of TRIPS suggests “non-reliance on the originator’s data 
for a particular period of time” as the definition of the obligation to protect 
the data against “unfair commercial use.”46  Typically, governments do 
44. The role of patent protection to minor innovation and how it detrimentally affects the cost 
of medication has become a matter of debate. Researchers and international organizations have 
highlighted the importance of access to medication issues. See, e.g., Experts in Chronic Myeloid 
Leukemia, The Price of Drugs for Chronic Myeloid Leukemia (CML) is a Reflection of the 
Unsustainable Prices of Cancer Drugs: From the Perspective of a Large Group of CML Experts, 121 
BLOOD J. 4439 (2013), http://www.bloodjournal.org/content/121/22/4439?sso-checked=true 
[https://perma.cc/KG5B-PVTD]; see also Report of the United Nations, supra note 5; see generally 
WHO study, PHARMALOT (May 31, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/05/31/gilead-
hepatitis-drug-prices-who/ [https://perma.cc/SX83-MJDE]. See also Over 1 Million Treated with 
Highly Effective Hepatitis C Medicines, supra note 5; Narcyz Ghinea et al., If We Don’t Talk about 
Value, Cancer Drugs will Become Terminal for Health Systems, THE CONVERSATION (July 26, 2015), 
http://theconversation.com/if-we-dont-talk-about-value-cancer-drugs-will-become-terminal-for-
healthsystems-44072 [https://perma.cc/KWY6-EWP3] (discussing a group of oncologists urging 
patients to talk about the price of medications). 
45. JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES, 199 (Kluwer Law International) (2001); see also Skillington & Solovy, supra note 10, 
at 15 (discussing how U.S., Swiss, and European proposals were used for the Uruguay Round 
Negotiations and also discussing why developing countries should give lesser protection for test data). 
46. Skillington & Solovy, supra note 10, at 20 (citing Jaques J. Gorlin, AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL-RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE TRIPS (INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY) AGREEMENT 
48 (1999)) (“United states negotiators agreed to drop the non-reliance language, because they viewed 
the phrase as no more than ‘belts and suspenders’; that is, the accepted definition at the time of 
‘production against unfair commercial use’ included non-reliance for a fixed period of time for new 
chemical entities and the second phrase was, therefore, not need.”).  
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not rely on the data as much as use it to examine or analyze the data 
towards approval. Under Article 39, governments have a clear duty to 
ensure non-reliance of undisclosed data by third parties on the originator’s 
data. An early draft of the agreement dated November 23, 1990 may be 
informative on the question of whether governments are also required to 
not rely on the data. The 1990 draft outlined that “the data may not be 
relied upon for the approval of competing products for a reasonable time, 
generally no less than five years . . . .”47 A plain reading of this draft 
suggests that governments could not rely on the data for approving 
competing products. This draft was meant to be included as a 
recommendation and not an obligation under Article 39.3. However, this 
draft was not adopted. Instead, the currently prevailing broad language 
was inserted into Article 39 leaving room for the possibility that, under 
the final agreement, the language regarding extending the non-disclosure 
obligation remain flexible for countries to take a variant approach. 
C. What Amounts to “Unfair Commercial Use?” 
Article 39 requires that undisclosed information not be used in a 
manner resulting in an unfair commercial advantage. The definition of 
“unfair commercial use” remains closely tied to the definition of 
undisclosed information, discussed above. In fact, the terms of Article 
39.3 are couched using the definition of the term “unfair commercial use” 
as the basis.48 Perhaps, the most outstanding and controversial question 
revolving around this phrase is whether the use of the data by a 
government authority would amount to “unfair commercial use,” or would 
it be legitimate use by the state? 
The terms “unfair” and what amounts to “commercial use” are 
undefined in the TRIPS Agreement, thus providing the flexibility for 
members to define the elements constituting unfair commercial use. It 
would be advantageous to define these terms using a national scale, while 
carefully considering national health requirements. Developing countries 
may and should choose to define the terms strictly to include uses of the 
data by a commercial/corporate entity but in a manner leaving out the use 
of the data by government authorities. Arguably, the use of the data by 
government authorities for public or administrative purposes can and will 
indirectly qualify as commercial because it would facilitate use by a third-
party applicant. On a plain reading, TRIPS does not elaborate on 
47. Id. at 32. 
48. Id.
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“indirect” commercial use. In any case, such indirect use may still be 
justified under the Article’s broad “public use” exception.49 
Alternately, the intermediate position that also conforms to TRIPS is 
for national governments to consider instituting specific public interest-
based exceptional circumstancessuch as when a compulsory license has 
been issued conforming with the TRIPS requirementsto permit such 
indirect commercial use of the data by regulators. Chile’s Industrial 
Property Law serves as a great example of this. When, on account of a 
bilateral free trade agreement with the United States, Chile reluctantly 
introduced data exclusivity provisions, it carved out several public 
interest-based exceptions to the exclusive rights over the data (as well as 
over the patent monopoly) such as including “reasons of public health, 
national security, public noncommercial use, national emergency, or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency; or, the pharmaceutical product is the 
subject of a compulsory license.”50 
Overall, countries such as India would benefit from following the 
developing country position submitted in 2001 to the TRIPS Council 
asserting that a drug regulatory authority’s use of originator test data as a 
basis for granting approval to a generic product did not constitute an 
“unfair commercial use.”51 Having taken that position in the international 
forum, developing countries should not hesitate to institute it in national 
legislation. Thus, what amounts to unfair use in a commercial manner 
needs elaboration using national health care requirements. The 
requirement in Article 39 is grounded on the assumption that without data 
exclusivity, the originators of the innovative drug would be placed at an 
unfair commercial disadvantage when compared to their generic 
competitors; especially when considering their investments in conducting 
the clinical trials to meet the mandated requirements set by regulatory 
bodies for drug approval. But, generic manufacturers sell at a fraction of 
the cost, in turn, benefitting the consumers. For countries that prioritize 
access to medication and national health care, it is worth prioritizing 
consumer interests. Countries such as India, where healthcare tends to be 
an individual expense, should carefully take these parameters into due 
consideration. 
49. Id. at 34-35. 
50. Industrial Property Law, 19.039 (2006) (Chile); see also CARSTEN FINK, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK 
394 (Jean-Pierre Chauffour & Jean-Christophe eds., 2011). 
51. Developing Country Group’s Paper, TRIPS: Council Discussion on Access to Medicines, 
WORLD TRADE ORG. (June 19, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/
paper_develop_w296_e.htm [https://perma.cc/REF9-LDEP].  
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The built-in flexibility in Article 39 should effectively be used by all 
countries, especially those that are in the developing spectrum, to 
mandatorily outline that the use by government authorities to assess the 
efficacy and toxicity of a pharmaceutical product does not amount to 
“unfair commercial use.” Thus, the prevalence of “unfair commercial use” 
should automatically be deemed if or when a competitor directly accessed 
the originator’s submitted test data during the protection period. As such, 
such a reading would be in line with the requirement in Article 39.3 and 
will result in governments protecting the innovator’s data from unfair 
access by third parties. 
Not all scholars agree with this line of interpretation. For instance, a 
view in opposition expounded by Shamnad Basheer terms the above as a 
“permissive reliance model.”52 Mr. Basheer disagrees with this model and 
asserts that a closer look at the wording of Article 39.3 suggests that the 
obligation to “[p]revent unfair commercial use of regulatory data is 
primarily addressed to regulatory agencies/government, as opposed to a 
private third party likely to have access to regulatory data in an 
unauthorized manner.”53 He asserts that any reading of the term “unfair” 
in a manner allowing regulatory authorities to rely on originator’s data to 
approve a competing generic product is flawed.54 He seems to favor the 
“compensatory liability model,” which suggests that governments can 
rely on the data only when compensation is provided.55 The compensatory 
liability model, in suggesting that regulators need to compensate for 
relying on the originator’s data, treats the data as property. Even Mr. 
Basheer himself agrees that Article 39 of TRIPS does not mandate the 
treatment of the data as property.56 In any case, even within taking the 
compensatory liability model proposed by Mr. Basheer, governments 
should still be able to carve out a “public interest-based” reliance 
exception. One example would be where protected data is used towards 
the approval of a generic drug when a compulsory license has been issued 
in compliance with the TRIPS prescription. Such allowance will be in 
consumer interest and can facilitate the immediate marketing of the drug 
either as soon as the patent or the data exclusivity period expires, as the 
case is. 
52. Basheer, supra note 32, at 19. 
53. Id. at 20. 
54. Id. at 23. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 16. 
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D. What is a New Chemical Entity? 
Just like the other terms, the term “new chemical entity” has not been 
defined under Article 39. The lack of definition provides adequate breadth 
and flexibility for members to define the term based on national interest. 
Drug regulatory agencies, such as the USFDA, define a “new chemical 
entity” as a drug “that contains no active moiety that has been approved 
by FDA in any other application submitted under section 505(b) of the 
Act.”57 This is a classic example of how each country can define the term 
based on the type of industry it wants to protect. There is nothing in the 
Article that requires the definition of a new chemical entity to relate to the 
time when the active ingredient was first discovered or synthesized.58 
The following example underscores the need to define NCEs 
carefully. Assume Company A files for patent protection and also seeks 
approval for marketing of Drug MNO. Now, assume that Competitor B 
opposes the patent application successfully such that the patent 
application is denied. The information in the patent application will fall 
into the public domain and can be rightfully used by generic drug 
companies. The question is whether the application material, being MNO, 
will continue to be considered a “new” chemical entity for the purposes 
of the marketing of MNO. That is, whether the denial of patent protection 
should result in the chemical entity losing its status of “new chemical 
entity” for regulatory purposes. 
A definition that follows the United States for defining a new 
chemical entity will result in providing data exclusivity for a period of 
five to seven years even when the patent application has failed. Thus, 
Company A will benefit from an indirect market monopoly (which, in this 
Article, is termed as market exclusivity) over the Drug MNO for the 
period when the clinical trial data is considered exclusive even though its 
patent has been denied. That is, when the patent is denied leaving MNO 
susceptible for use by a generic drug company, it will still prevent such 
companies to get marketing approval for MNO. This is because the test 
data (the data on the drug’s success for use against acne, its side effects 
information, etc.) are protected under the data exclusivity regime of the 
United States. Therefore, a generic drug company will be unable to use 
the innovator’s clinical data as part of its application to seek marketing 
57. See Small Business Assistance: FAQ for New Drug Product Exclusivity, FDA (Feb. 11,
2016), www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/smallbusinessassistance/ucm069962.htm 
[https://perma.cc/C96Y-8SK5].  
58. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 505(b), 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1938); but see Gorlin, 
supra note 42.  
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approval before the end of the data exclusivity period, which is a good 
seven years during which time consumers will be unfairly denied access 
to medication otherwise in the public domain. For consumers, Company 
A’s market exclusivity comes at a financial cost as well as at the cost of 
access to the medication. Of course, generic drug companies are free to 
conduct their own clinical trials considering that the drug is not a subject 
of patent protection.59 But, such duplication of clinical trials will result in 
subjecting a new set of patients to the same clinical trial and involves 
additional: 1) cost to conduct the trial; and 2) delay in manufacturing the 
generic drug while the trial is being conducted. Thus, generic drug 
companies duplicating a clinical trial already conducted elsewhere will 
result in duplicative burdens in terms of time and cost. While the cost of 
the trial will be added to the cost of the drug and passed onto consumers 
by unnecessarily raising the cost of generic drugs, the delay from 
duplicating the clinical trial will result in delaying access to the 
consumers. 
Importantly, Article 39 necessitates protection of “new” chemical 
entities. But, it should be up to the member country to define the 
constituents of “new” chemical entities. The language in Article 39 
provides adequate flexibility to construe the term differently. Thus, there 
is nothing to prevent a member from treating a chemical whose patent has 
been invalidated or denied as not being “new.” After all, innovator 
pharmaceuticals have asserted that patent status should be linked to 
providing regulatory clearance (patent linkage).60 Along the same lines, 
countries that house generic drug companies should connect patent status 
with the definition of “new” for the purposes of defining NCEs. Needless 
to highlight, originator pharmaceutical companies prefer an interpretation 
that treats the term “new chemical entities” as a regulatory concept 
separate from the “novelty” requirement of patent protection, although 
there is no basis for such a treatment.61 
59. But see Lietzan, supra note 9, at 95 (asserting that data exclusivity does not truly fall within 
“exclusivity” because it creates a different path for a second applicant).  
60. See, e.g., Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) Special 301 
(2014), http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2014-special-301-submission.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6EPS-SZGC] (asserting the need for linkage to impose unilateral pressure on 
countries even though it is not a trade obligation); see also Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration 
Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 343 
(2008); see also Ron Bouchard et al., Empirical Analysis of Drug Approval-Drug Patenting Linkage 
for High Value Pharmaceuticals, 8 NW. J. OF TECH. AND INTELL. PROP. 174, 174-227 (2010), 
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1102&context=njtip 
[https://perma.cc/RC5S-RHEQ].  
61. See Gorlin, supra note 42. 
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Developing countries, particularly those that house generic drug 
companies, such as India, should define the boundaries of the term “new” 
carefully considering the patent status as well as the protection status for 
the data abroad. Some countries have defined the term to encourage 
innovator pharmaceutical companies to register new chemical entities as 
soon as they apply for marketing elsewhere in the world.62 Such a 
definition means to prevent evergreening of the data and facilitate quicker 
entry of the generic product into the market. For example, under a 
regulation circulated under Jordan’s Food and Drug Administration 
(JFDA) law, “in order to be considered new, a chemical entity should be 
submitted for registration to the JFDA within eighteen months of its first 
approval in any other country.”63 A definition along these lines can 
prevent misuse by the originator during the data protection period. 
I believe that developing countries, especially those like India and 
Brazil, should appreciate that for pharmaceutical companies and countries 
that are lobbied by them, such as the United States, data exclusivity 
represents an economic opportunity to preserve their market for just a 
little longer even if the patent is invalidated. Unlike these countries, for 
developing countries where the access to medication question remains 
dominant, it is important to use all available flexibilities and establish a 
coherent approach. 
E. “Known” Chemical Entities 
The definition of the term “new chemical entity” in Article 39 raises 
several questions on the definition of “new.”64 It particularly raises 
questions with reference to “known” chemical entities. Whether “new” 
chemical entities also include chemicals or formulations already “known” 
within the same or another related field remains unresolved. The term 
“known” chemical entities typically tend to refer to different forms of an 
existing chemical entity, such as esters, ethers, polymorphs etc., and 
newer combinations or formulations of known chemicals that yield 
benefits that may be different from already known benefits.65 Generally, 
if the chemical entity had been previously received and subject to scrutiny 
by the drug regulatory authority, it should not benefit from a second 
62. See generally Armouti & Nsour, supra note 41. 
63. See id.; see also JORDAN FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.jfda.jo/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q3U5-AXSH] (last visited Aug. 15, 2014). 
64. Basheer, supra note 32 (discussing the various interpretations of the “new” definition, such 
as whether “new” refers to the first global application in the world; and whether the term includes 
chemical entities previously known or disclosed).   
65. See generally, infra note 67. 
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protection period even if the application is for a different disease or 
treatment. Such a definition of “known” can also conserve regulatory time 
spent in examining different versions of known chemical entities and can 
help channelize that time to more thoroughly examine new drugs and 
chemical entities, especially in places where regulatory resources may be 
lesser, such as in developing countries. 
On this question, Canada serves as a great example for developing 
countries. It does not allow data protection for known drugs (especially if 
they were previously used to develop orphan indications) on the grounds 
that such drugs would not be deemed to be “innovative.”66 In fact, under 
the Canadian Food and Drug Regulations of 2006,  an “innovative drug” 
is defined as “a drug that contains a medicinal ingredient not previously 
approved in a drug by the Minister [of Health] and that is not a variation 
of a previously approved medicinal ingredient such as a salt, ester, 
enantiomer, solvate or polymorph.”67 Further, several decisions of the 
Federal Court of Canada have upheld a strict interpretation of the terms 
“previously approved” and “variation” within the definition of 
“innovative drug.” For example, in a decision involving Epicept 
Corporation’s application to market the drug CEPLENE for a new 
oncology indicator, the court determined that the active ingredient 
(histamine dihydrochloride) was not “innovative” and thus could not 
benefit from data protection because it had been previously approved for 
an unrelated homeopathic use.68 Importantly, the approval for CEPLENE, 
based on a full package of clinical trial data, was refused even though 
homeopathic drugs are not approved in the same manner as therapeutics 
in Canada.69 Similarly, the Federal Court of Appeals of Canada sustained 
a decision that refused to treat THALOMID as an “innovative drug” on 
the basis that its active ingredient (thalidomide) had been previously 
approved in Canada decades earlier.70 This is despite the fact that the 
earlier drug had another clinical usage and was subsequently withdrawn 
from the market for being unsafe.71 The applicant, Celgene, claimed its 
drug was in fact an “innovative” drug in view of newly generated clinical 
66. Megan Kendall & Declan Hamill, A Decade of Data Protection for Innovative Drugs in 
Canada: Issues, Limitations, and Time for a Reassessment, 35 BIOTECHNOL L. REP. 259, 259-67 
(2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5178005/ [https://perma.cc/D3TP-SBXE].  
67. See Canadian Food and Drug Regulations, C.R.C., c. 870/2017, C.08.004.1(1). 
68. Epicept Corp. v. Canada (Health), [2010] F.C. 956 (Can. Ont.). 
69. Id.
70. Celgene Inc. v. Canada (Health), [2012] F.C. 154 (Can. Ont.).
71. Canada (Health) v. Celgene Inc., [2013] F.C.A. 43 (Can. Ont.). 
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trial data for a completely different disease condition than the original 
product.72 
The United States treats “new” to include “new dosage forms and 
combinations” (which essentially includes known uses of known entities). 
In the United States, the prior approval of a drug containing an active 
ingredient does not preclude a finding of the presence of active ingredients 
in a later application.73 In trade negotiations, especially in the Free Trade 
Agreements with other countries, the United States tends to prefer a 
definition that does not clearly differentiate known chemical entities from 
new chemical entities that are eligible for data protection. Developing 
countries should understand the various options and what each of these 
options entails to their national interests before blindly succumbing to 
pressure from the United States. 
F. Does New Chemical Entity Include Biologics? 
On the face of it, biologics are not included within the scope of 
Article 39.3’s requirement to protect new chemical entities.74 The NCEs 
should not, by definition, include biologics. The decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, holding that naturally occurring products are 
not per se patentable when denying the patentability of an isolated, 
naturally occurring DNA sequence, makes it harder to justify the 
protection of any test data by treating biologics as “new.”75 Similarly, the 
USPTO Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility of Claims 
Reciting or Involving Laws of Nature, Natural Phenomena, & Natural 
Products asserts that: 
[C]hemicals derived from natural sources (e.g., antibiotics, fats, oils, pe-
troleum derivatives, resins, toxins, etc.); foods (e.g., fruits, grains, meats 
and vegetables); metals and metallic compounds that exist in nature; 
minerals; natural materials (e.g., rocks, sands, soils); nucleic acids; or-
ganisms (e.g., bacteria, plants and multicellular animals); proteins and 
peptides; and other substances found in or derived from nature . . . [will 
be considered natural and hence, will be not be considered patentable 
unless the] claim as a whole recite[s] something significantly different 
72. Kendall & Hamill, supra note 66. 
73. Aparna Nemlekar, Nicole Stakleff & Raymond Miller, FDA Is Evolving on Qualifications 
For ‘New Chemical Entity’, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (Sept. 7, 2016), 
http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/fda-is-evolving-on-qualifications-for-new-chemical-entity-
2016-09-07/ [https://perma.cc/RZ3Y-YQMP].  
74. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8. 
75. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
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than the judicial exception(s).76 
Similar language is employed in the 2016 Guidelines clearly highlighting 
requirements for rejection on the basis of the law of nature or natural 
phenomenon exception.77 
Considering that data exclusivity is for “new” “chemical” entities, it 
would be harder to justify data protection for biologics that are denied 
patent protection because they lack novelty on account of falling within 
the scope of “naturally occurring products.” There is nothing in Article 39 
that requires something that is not considered “new” in patent law to be 
treated as “new” for the purpose of data exclusivity. 
Nevertheless, there is also a line of argument that asserts that because 
patents are likely to be either not granted or invalidated more quickly with 
biologics, drug companies would be discouraged from investing in 
research over biological substances which remain important for certain 
types of therapies, such as cancer therapies.78 Others assert that “biotech 
products, like monoclonal antibodies, are very difficult for generic 
companies to develop and the absence of data exclusivity in a country 
would discourage the originator company from entering this market, 
which would have the deleterious effect of depriving people of the 
benefits of these drugs.”79 These arguments are typically used to lobby 
higher levels of data protection on the grounds that innovative firms need 
such protection for their investment in clinical trials and data collection, 
regardless of patentability of the involved biologics.80 It is notable that in 
the United States the Affordable Health Care for America Act in 2009 
extended a 12-year exclusivity period for biologics.81 
These arguments are not persuasive for developing countries 
considering that their obligations are limited to those outlined in Article 
39 of TRIPS. Further, the current abysmal state of the health care system 
in the United States, the high cost of prescription drugs, and the criticisms 
by public health and consumer groups opposing the enormous influence 
76. Andrew Hirshfeld, USPTO Procedure For Subject Matter Eligibility Analysis Of Claims
Reciting Or Involving Laws of Nature, Natural Phenomena, & Natural Products (Mar. 4, 2014).  
77. See Robert Bahr, Formulating a Subject Matter Eligibility Rejection and Evaluating the
Applicant’s Response to a Subject Matter Eligibility Rejection (Mar. 4, 2016), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-may-2016-memo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZX42-SF2W].  
78. Skillington & Solovy, supra note 10, at 2−6. 
79. See Armouti & Nsour, supra note 41. 
80. See Lybecker, When Patents Aren’t Enough, supra note 12.
81. Affordable Health Care for America Act, 155 CONG. REC. H12623, 12784 (Nov. 7, 2009). 
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that pharmaceutical companies have over the various American 
administrations are all reasons for not following the U.S. system.82 
G. Reliability of Clinical Trial Information from Other Countries 
The question of whether it is acceptable to rely on clinical trial data 
of another country has much significance to countries that do not house 
innovative pharmaceutical companies. Historically, before the TRIPS 
Agreement was negotiated, most countries allowed reliance on originator 
test data to approve generic products. Generic manufacturers had to only 
prove bioequivalence, which is that their product is chemically identical 
to the brand name, original product.83 The approach that has been 
historically followedthe pre-TRIPS approachwas consumer friendly 
in that it enabled introduction of generics into the market as soon as the 
patent expired. The importance of preserving the historic approach is 
underscored by the recent United Nations Secretary-General’s High-
Level Panel on Access to Medicines Report,84  the WIPO Development 
Agenda,85 and the WHO Studies,86 all of which highlight the importance 
of access to medication. It is a documented fact that generics have not 
only been able to save costs, but have also enabled access to medication 
in several parts of the world.87 
82. See Test Data Protection for Medical Inventions, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Aug. 8,
2017), https://www.keionline.org/testdata [https://perma.cc/QEG4-G2TL]. 
83. Generic manufacturers should establish bioequivalence for each compound. Note that
bioequivalence can be proved for a different salt too, although, within agreed bioequivalence levels. 
See generally Christoph Baumgärtel et al., What Lessons can be Learned from the Launch of Generic 
Clopidogrel?, 1 GABI J. 58 (Mar. 5, 2012), http://gabi-journal.net/what-lessons-can-be-learnt-from-
the-launch-of-generic-clopidogrel.html [https://perma.cc/C4HU-Q9BE] (highlighting issues that 
arise with reference to generic clopidogrel because manufacturers used the technicalities of Plavix’s 
European patent protection early and produced clopidogrel in a different salt, such as the besylate salt. 
Thus, the generic version was launched for secondary prevention of certain uses clearly and 
strategically excluding primary syndromes. This prevented health authorities from using the generic 
medication for some conditions thus sustaining the use of the branded medication.). Especially when 
there are secondary patents, there have been controversies about how some pharmaceutical companies 
misuse this provision. For example, with the drug pregabalin, the manufacturer had different patents 
for different indications. The company threatened to take physicians to court if the generic version 
was prescribed to treat neuropathic pain instead of the patented version. See Brian Godman et al., 
Generic Pregabalin: Current Situation and Implications for Health Authorities, Generic and 
Biosimilar Manufacturers in the Future, 3 GABI J. 125 (June 12, 2015), 
https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/53359/ [https://perma.cc/ZRH3-TN3V]. 
84. See Report of the United Nations, supra note 5. 
85. See generally Development Agenda for WIPO, supra note 5. 
86. Silverman, supra note 5; see also Over 1 Million Treated with Highly Effective Hepatitis
C Medicines, supra note 5.  
87. See, e.g., Generics Could cut Costs of Cancer Drugs by Over 99%, GABI (Apr. 14, 2017), 
http://www.gabionline.net/Generics/Research/Generics-could-cut-costs-of-cancer-drugs-by-over-99 
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Currently, India, like the United States, has established regulations 
that require an applicant for a new drug to engage in extensive testing and 
clinical trials. But, the requirement may be waived for purposes of “public 
interest” or if the new drug has been approved and marketed for several 
years in other countries.88 Thus, the Indian Drugs and Cosmetics Act of 
1940 provides for data exclusivity for a “new drug” under section 122E 
(for a total period of four years from the date of approval).89 The Indian 
law does not connect the definition of a “new drug” with its patent status 
but defines it as a drug which has not been used in the country to any 
significant extent. A new drug in India is a product that: 1) has not been 
recognized or licensed in India; 2) has been recently licensed and 
approved for marketing; 3) is a combination drug individually approved 
earlier but will be marketed as a combination; or 4) is a vaccine and 
Recombinant DNA (r-DNA) derived drug. 
Similarly, the Argentinian Law on the Confidentiality of Information 
and Products, No. 24,766 outlines that with respect to new chemicals not 
previously registered in Argentina or in any other country (listed in 
Addendum I), information on the effectiveness and safety of the product 
should be provided to the local Public Health Authority.90 The law further 
adds that the product already registered in Argentina or in any of the 
countries listed in the Addendum, will be authorized by the Public Health 
Authority for marketing.91 Thus, known chemicals (even those unknown 
nationally but known in addendum countries) are covered under this. 
[https://perma.cc/A35S-B9RH]; Brian Godman et al., Payers Endorse Generics to Enhance 
Prescribing Efficiency: Impact and Future Implications, a Case History Approach, 1 GABI J. 69, 69-
83 (2012), http://gabi-journal.net/payers-endorse-generics-to-enhance-prescribing-efficiency-
impact-and-future-implications-a-case-history-approach.html [https://perma.cc/3SEA-TN44] 
(asserting that the savings from generics when compared with the originator is considerable); see also 
Alexandra Cameron et al., Switching from Originator Brand Medicines to Generic Equivalents in 
Selected Developing Countries: How Much Could be Saved?, 15 ELSEVIER, VALUE IN HEALTH 664 
(2012), http://www.valueinhealthjournal.com/article/S1098-3015(12)01547-1/pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A86N-3JSX]; see also Brian Godman et al., Multiple Policies to Enhance 
Prescribing Efficiency for Established Medicines in Europe with a Particular Focus on Demand-Side 
Measures: Findings and Future Implications, 5 FRONTIERS IN PHARMACOLOGY 1 (June 2014) 
(highlighting some of the policies that Europe pursued to maintain universal health care).  
88. See Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, at § 122E (amended 1995) (India), http://cdsco.nic.in 
[https://perma.cc/7Z2T-28DE]. 
89. Id. 
90. See Law of Confidentiality on Information and Products that are Legitimately Under the
Control of a Person and is Disclosed in a manner Contrary to Honest Commercial Uses, No. 24,766 
Articles 4 and 5 (Arg.); Data Exclusivity: Encouraging Development of New Medicines, INT’L FED’N 
OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS ASS’N, (July 2011) at 10-11, 
https://www.ifpma.org/resource-centre/data-exclusivity-encouraging-development-of-new-
medicines/ [https://perma.cc/UJ4D-CLRG].   
91. Id.
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The Indian and Argentinian requirement discussed above is a 
standard norm to avoid duplication of trials in different jurisdictions 
which can result in increasing the cost and delaying the introduction of a 
generic drug in the market. Clinical trials are costly not just financially 
but also in terms of the patient suffering. That is, during the time period 
when a trial is being conducted, other patients wait in the pipeline; 
similarly, the administering of the drug as part of the trial to wrong patient 
groups can lead to detrimental side effects. So, if a study has already been 
extensively conducted, unless there are red-flags in that study that require 
further investigation, or population variations that warrant a different 
study (for example, impact of a drug on Asians versus African 
Americans), to reinvent the same study may just be an exercise draining 
valuable time and cost. 
The use of data from other countries raises questions about their 
protection status. The typical question as to whether data undisclosed in 
one part of the world should be considered undisclosed in another part of 
the world remains unclear. Thus, if Company A discloses the data to the 
USFDA and then submits the same data in India after, say, four years, 
should India treat it as undisclosed, and if so, for how long? The ideal 
situation would be that if the drug regulator seeks information that is under 
protected status in another country, then it should be considered protected 
for the same length of time.92 Assume that after seeing Company A’s 
application, a drug regulator in India wants particular clinical trial data 
from the United States that will enjoy two more years of protection in the 
United States; India should similarly protect the data for the remaining 
two years. Under the same logic, and considering that intellectual property 
laws are territorial in nature, any data voluntarily submitted in excess of 
what is required to approve the product in India need not be subject to 
such protection. Therefore, when data is reused in a second country, it 
may be subject to the laws and conditions of that country. Thus, the second 
country may extend the “undisclosed” status for the remaining term, 
taking the year of the first jurisdiction that applied protection into 
consideration. This view has been supported by academics like Carlos 
Correa and in other countries as well.93 The geographic flexibility remains 
important for all countries to carefully define the limits of the undisclosed 
term to balance with local healthcare needs. 
92. See generally Armouti & Nsour, supra note 41.
93. Carlos Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPs Agreement: Protection of Data
Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 69, 72-73 (2002); see also 
Armouti & Nsour, supra note 41.   
27
Ragavan: Data Exclusivity
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
1190 AKRON LAW REVIEW [51:1163 
H. Should Exclusivity be Relaxed when National Markets are Not 
Being Supplied? 
“National markets not being supplied” is a ground for imposing a 
compulsory license under the TRIPS Agreement.94 Countries like India 
and Chile have statutorily included this as a ground for imposing 
compulsory licenses.95 When such a provision is effectuated to impose a 
compulsory license, similar to what happened when Bayer did not supply 
Nexavar in India, in the interest of the public, patents rights are 
suspended.96 Under those circumstances, the “public interest” exception 
outlined in Article 39 can be used to create statutory exceptions in national 
legislations to the use of the data for approving a competitor’s application 
to supply the market. For example, under Chile’s Industrial Property Law, 
pharmaceutical products not being marketed in the Chilean territory 
within 12 months from the registration or health authorization issued in 
Chile, or where the owner of the test data engages in conduct deemed 
contrary to free competition, are two specific exceptions to data 
exclusivity provisions (as well as over the patent monopoly) meant to 
provide access to healthcare.97 
The United States does not follow the above prescription. Arguably, 
the United States embraces the most stringent data protection regime. In 
the Fabrazyme case, the National Institute of Health (NIH), dealing 
specifically with the question of refusing to exercise march-in rights,98 
noted that the U.S. rules on test data exclusivity granted an absolute 
monopoly on the data that could not be waived even when the originator 
was unable to supply the U.S. market.99 This was in response to a patient 
group petition filed to the NIH on the grounds that the patent owner and 
its exclusive licensee harmed public health by severely rationing the 
supply of agalsidase beta, which is the only approved therapeutic 
treatment for Fabry disease.100 
That said, the United States has come under pressure from the public. 
So far, the NIH has resisted using the march-in rights; but the rights exist 
under the Bayh-Dole Act.101 Recently, the NIH, regarding Xalatan, which 
94. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at Art. 31.
95. See The Patents (Amendment) Act, 1970 (as amended in 2005) at § 84 (India).
96. Bayer v. Natco M.P. Nos 74–76 of 2012 and M.P. No.108 of 2012 (India). 
97. Industrial Property Law, supra note 50; see also FINK, supra note 50, at 394. 
98. 35 U.S.C.S. § 203 (LexisNexis 2017).
99. See Test Data Protection for Medical Inventions, supra note 82. 
 100.  See 2010 Fabrazyme March-in Request, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Aug. 8, 2017), 
https://www.keionline.org/fabrazyme [https://perma.cc/SE83-NQMG]. 
101.  35 U.S.C.S. § 200 (LexisNexis 2018). 
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is an expensive drug used for glaucoma treatment,102 defended its 
hesitancy to interfere using the march-in power to correct excessive 
pricing on the grounds that it could alter the market dynamics for all 
products developed pursuant to licensing rights under the Bayh-Dole 
Act.103 But, the NIH has clearly indicated that this is an area ripe for 
congressional consideration.104 Any congressional action to consider 
administrative, regulatory, or other forms of interference into the pricing 
of pharmaceuticals will have to deal with the question of data exclusivity 
over the clinical trials, although that may not happen anytime soon. 
I. Data Exclusivity & Patent Linkage 
The last issue that relates to data exclusivity is patent linkage. The 
tying in of patent information with the data exclusivity is called patent 
linkage.105 Basically, when patent linkage is instituted, it would deem 
marketing approval of a competitor’s product as a patent violation if there 
is patent protection over the application material. The question is whether 
TRIPS requires drug regulatory authorities to consider patent status before 
approving a generic substitute for marketability. Pharmaceutical 
companies assert that Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement requires 
national governments to statutorily include patent linkage provisions.106 
Such a patent linkage provision will essentially add an additional 
responsibility on the drug regulator and prevent them from clearing any 
competing versions of a drug for marketing if there is a patent prevailing 
on any similar version of the application material.107 
The benefit of reading patent linkage into TRIPS is that typically, 
after the patent expires, the innovator will indirectly enjoy a market 
monopoly (market exclusivity as defined earlier in this Article) until the 
drug regulator clears the generic version which can be anywhere from two 
 102.  Elias A. Zerhouni, Director, NIH, In the case of Xalatan, Manufactured by Pfizer, Inc. 
(Sept. 17, 2004), https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/March-in-xalatan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9MME-ZWC8]. 
103.  35 U.S.C.S. § 200 (LexisNexis 2018). 
 104.  See Zerhouni, supra note 102 (“[T]he NIH believes that the issue of whether drug pricing 
should be consistent across the spectrum of developing countries is one that would be more 
appropriately addressed by Congress, as it considered these matters in a larger context.”).  
105.  See id.  
106.  See, e.g., Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. No.7833 of 2008, Aug. 18, 2009; 
see also Bayer Corporation & Anr v. Union of India & Ors, Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Writ 
Petition No.7833 of 2008, Aug. 18, 2009. 
 107.  See Ravikant Bharadwaj, K.D. Raju & M. Padmawati, The Impact of Patent Linkage on 
Marketing of Generic Drugs, 18 J. OF INTELL. PROP. RTS. 316-22 (2013), 
http://www.isglp.org/papers/india/ravikant/Ravikant%20Bhardwaj%20Publication%20(3).pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XK5S-4PTU]. 
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to four years after the expiration of patent protection. A study by the 
Federal Trade Commission highlighted that typically there is a 4- to 40-
month delay in the introduction of the generics when there is patent 
linkage.108 For poorer nations, imposing the linkage requirement will add 
one more regulatory layer involving additional cost and time. Patent 
linkage is a mechanism typically used to delay the entry of generic 
competition into the market. 
Developed countries, especially the United States, assert that during 
the patent period, drug regulators should be prevented from approving a 
generic substitute. The United States unilaterally pressures other countries 
to include patent linkage provisions statutorily.109 In the United States, the 
history of patent linkage is unique. When the Hatch-Waxman Act110 was 
enacted, innovator pharmaceutical companies realized that they cannot 
deny generic drugs to the market anymore. Hence, patent linkage was 
proposed as an alternative to delay the entry of generic competition.111 
Thus, when a generic drug company makes an application (ANDA 
application), the FDA will process the application only if there is no valid 
patent on the same.112  But, this has no international or universal relevance 
nor is this sound public health policy. 
Canada, which tries to maintain a balance between innovator and 
generic pharmaceuticals, has a more nuanced approach wherein the 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations (NOC 
Regulations)113 provide for patent linkage. Under this, as part of seeking 
 108.  Chuan-feng Wu, Raising the Right to Health Concerns within the Framework of 
International Intellectual Property Law, 5 ASIAN J. OF WTO & INT’L HEALTH LAW & POL’Y, 141, 
141-205 (March 2010).  
 109.  Id. In 2011 alone, about 16 countries, many of them developing, added patent linkage terms 
as part of its bilateral agreement with the United States. Id.   
 110.  The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Publ. L. No. 98-
417, 1586-1605, (1984). 
 111.  See, e.g., Ron A. Bouchard et al, Emphirical Analysis of Drug-Approval-Drug Patenting 
Linkage for High Value Pharmaceuticals, 2 NW. J. OF TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 174, 174-227 (2010) 
(“The linkage regulation regime in particular has proven to be an excellent vehicle for firms to obtain 
extended legal protection on drugs at all stages of development, including drugs about to come off 
patent protection, drugs moving through the regulatory approval stage, and drugs that are currently in 
development.”).  
 112.  See, e.g., Federal Food Drug & Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 505(j)(2)(A)(vii) (1938), 
which requires the ANDA applicant to state information, including the following: that such patent has 
expired (a paragraph II certification); the date on which such patent will expire (a paragraph III 
certification); or that such patent is invalid, unenforceable, or will not be infringed by the manufacture, 
use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted (a paragraph IV certification). 
113.  The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, GOV’T OF CAN. (Oct. 27, 
2016), https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/drug-products/
applications-submissions/guidance-documents/patented-medicines/notice-compliance-
regulations.html [https://perma.cc/KZ5P-XCSR].  
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marketing approval from Health Canada for a generic drug, the generic 
manufacturer is required to address the issues from any patents that the 
innovator may assert against it in a summary proceeding which can lead 
to either a patent validity or infringement litigation, under some 
circumstances.114 
The question is not whether patent linkage is beneficial or not. In 
fact, countries that house innovator pharmaceutical companies will cater 
to patent linkage because it is in their best interest. Countries such as India 
(which predominantly houses a generic drug industry), and Brazil and 
Chile (which provide for universal health coverage) will be disadvantaged 
with patent linkage because it largely serves to delay generic drugs from 
entering into the market. 
In India, marketing approval of drugs is not linked with the status of 
patents. The Indian position is that linking patent data with drug approval 
increases the burden of the generic drug company to prove the existence 
or otherwise of patents, and adds another layer of responsibility over the 
administrator.115 The question of whether Article 39 obligates members 
to establish patent linkage arose in India in relation to the approval of a 
generic version of “sorafenib tosylate,” a drug used to treat renal cell 
cancer.116 The Supreme Court sustained the judgment of the Delhi High 
Court which dismissed the argument that patent linkage formed a part of 
the Article 39 obligation. Bayer, the patent owner, approached the 
Supreme Court of India to prevent the grant of marketing approval to 
Cipla.117 Bayer asserted that the TRIPS Agreement necessitated the 
establishment of patent linkage preventing the drug controller from 
approving the marketing of drugs whose patent was not owned by the 
applicant, Cipla. The Delhi High Court was persuaded by the presence of 
a Bolar Provision under Section 107A of the Indian Patents Act of 1970 
which specifically exempted the use of data for regulatory processes from 
infringement with a view to permit immediate availability of generic 
 114.  See generally Kristina Lybecker, Intellectual Property Rights & Bio-pharmaceutical 
Industry: How Canada Measures Up, FRASIER INST. (Jan. 2017), https://www.fraserinstitute.org/
sites/default/files/intellectual-property-rights-protection-and-the%20biopharmaceutical-industry.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/25XW-W5AZ]. 
 115.  See The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970 § 107(A); see also Srividhya Ragavan, Data 
Exclusivity: A Tool to Sustain Market Monopoly, 8 JINDAL L. REV. 241, 241-60 (2017).  
 116.  Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. No.7833 of 2008, Aug. 18, 2009; see also 
Bayer Corporation & Anr v. Union of India & Ors, Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Writ Petition 
No.7833 of 2008, Aug. 18, 2009. 
 117.  Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. No.7833 of 2008, Aug. 18, 2009; see also 
Bayer Corporation & Anr v. Union of India & Ors, Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Writ Petition 
No.7833 of 2008, Aug. 18, 2009. 
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drugs in the market when the patent expires.118 Nevertheless, that is an 
item that the United States has sought from India repeatedly under the 
Special 301 process on the grounds that Article 39 of TRIPS requires it.119 
Chile’s bilateral free trade agreement with the United States 
mandates patent-registration linkage and exclusive rights to 
pharmaceutical test data.120 Professor Carsten Fink notes that “Chile has 
implemented these obligations in a way that has sought to protect public 
health, promote coherence with patent rules, prevent anticompetitive 
behavior, and avoid imposing an undue burden on Chile’s public health 
authority.”121 Chile has a patent linkage requirement under Resolution 
5572 which obligates the Institute of Public Health to publish all 
applications for health registration on its website.122 The information on 
regulatory approvals are electronically posted to enable patent holders to 
monitor regulatory requests and seek an injunction from a Chilean court 
to prevent issuing the marketing approval if the patent holder believes that 
a pharmaceutical application for which a regulatory approval to market is 
sought infringes on a patent.123 
Importantly, Article 39 of TRIPS is certainly not worded to impose 
patent linkage.124 Even assuming that it was the case, such a reading of 
Article 39.3 will not survive the Doha Declaration on Public Health.125 
Data exclusivity and patent linkage also affects the operation of 
compulsory licenses.126 Otherwise, even when there is a public health 
118.  The Patents Act, supra note 115.  
 119.  See, e.g., Srividhya Ragavan, Sean Flynn & Brook Baker, Justifying India’s Patent 
Position to the United States International Trade Commission and Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, 7 INDIAN J. INTELL. PROP. LAW 1 (2015) (discussing the unilateral U.S. pressure on 
India to amend its patent laws in a manner not conducive to provide access to health-care for its poorer 
citizens).  
120.  Chile–United States Free Trade Agreement (signed June 6, 2003), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/chile/asset_upload_file535_3989.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NB3Q-28ED]. 
121.  FINK, supra note 50, at 394; see also Chile-United States Free Trade Agreement (signed 
June 6, 2003), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/chile/
asset_upload_file535_3989.pdf [https://perma.cc/NB3Q-28ED]. 
 122.  Industrial Property Law, supra note 50; Law No. 19.039, Revised, Coordinated and 
Systemized Text of The Industrial Property Law, Resolution 5572 of the Chilean Institute of Public 
Health, Mar. 9, 2006, Ministry of Economy [BCN] (Chile), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/
en/details.jsp?id=5324 [https://perma.cc/LK7R-ZUXQ] (providing overview of enactment of patent 
linkage requirements and amending Chilean Law No. 19.039 on Industrial Property, further 
containing a link to Resolution 5572 itself). 
123.  See also FINK, supra note 50, at 394.   
124.  See, e.g., id. at 391 (“The TRIPS Agreement does not impose any obligation of this kind.”). 
125.  World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746, ¶ 17 (2002). 
126.  See, e.g., Industrial Property Law, supra note 50. 
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crisis, the presence of patent linkage can prevent a regulator from 
approving the drug that may be needed to preserve public health 
conditions. Thus, any reading of Article 39 of TRIPS to impose patent 
linkage requirements will be read as violating the Doha Declaration on 
Public Health.127 
IV. CONCLUSION
The access to medication questions have become a burden that 
TRIPS continues to bear poorly. As patents and the cost of drug prices 
have become increasingly unpopular,128 data exclusivity has morphed into 
a more potent tool benefitting from vigorous focus from pharmaceutical 
lobbying groups.129 The unfortunate development seems to be that data 
exclusivity is quickly becoming a hurdle to public health. Notably, the 
public has a vested interest when any form of exclusivity is legally 
created, especially when it prevents or detrimentally affects access to life 
saving medication. 
Considering this, it is critical for developing countries to determine 
the extent of protection and to effectively use the public interest exception 
of Article 39.3. It is acknowledged that data exclusivity as a tool 
detrimentally affects generic competition.130 Thus, it is no coincidence 
that developing countries and free trade partners have been pressured by 
the United States Trade Representative to further extend data 
protection.131 Whether it be data exclusivity provisions or other TRIPS-
127.  Id. 
 128.  Ghinea et.al., supra note 44; see also Ayalew Tefferi et al., In Support of a Patient-Driven 
Initiative and Petition to Lower the High Price of Cancer Drugs, MAYO CLINIC PROC. 996 (Aug. 
2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mayocp.2015.06.001 [https://perma.cc/M4PL-BCZ4]; see also 
Donald Light & Hagop Kantarjian, Market Spiral Pricing of Cancer Drugs, CANCER, 3900 (Nov. 
2013), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/cncr.28321/epdf [https://perma.cc/9TVL-
RNUW]; see generally Brian Godman et al., Patent Expiry and Costs for Anti-cancer Medicines for 
Clinical Use: Expiry and Costs Anti-cancer Medicines, 6 GENERICS AND BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE J. 
(GABI J.) 105 (2017), https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/60241/ [https://perma.cc/M7SR-5XXW].  
129.  See, e.g., Ragavan, Data Exclusivity, supra note 115; see also Srividhya Ragavan, The 
Significance of the Data Exclusivity and its Impact on Generic Drugs, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. STUD. 131, 
134-37 (2017). 
 130.  See Xavier Seuba, Pharmaceutical Test Data Protection & Human Rights, P. K. Yu, (Ed.), 
Reshaping Intellectual Property Law through a Human Rights Lens, Cambridge University Press, 
2017 (extensively discussing access to medication issues from data exclusivity). 
 131.  The much higher standard of data exclusivity sought under the now-failed Trans-Pacific 
Partnership is a great example. See Lybecker, When Patents Aren’t Enough, supra note 12; see 
generally What does the TPP say About Data Exclusivity and Biosimilars?, MANAGED CARE, 
https://www.managedcaremag.com/focus/what-does-tpp-say-about-data-exclusivity-and-biosimilars 
[https://perma.cc/K8FA-ZHYH] (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). Similarly, in trade negotiations, and in 
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plus requirements to patent statutes, developing countries should 
appreciate that such compromises need not be emulated in every market, 
especially in countries that have a policy focus on enabling access to 
medication.132 In reality, for developing countries, generics have become 
a part of the global pharmaceutical industry. In fact, globally, generic 
drugs have become a necessary component of the pharmaceutical food 
chain, not only to cater to the access to health needs, but also to kick start 
innovation in poorer nations. It is also undisputed that historically, 
copying has been the first step for innovation even in the developed world. 
Thus, for innovation in pharmaceuticals to proliferate all over the 
world, generics will serve as the first step to kick start the industry. 
Especially for less-developed countries, the leap to innovation in 
pharmaceuticals will occur only when they take the first step of being able 
to establish generic drug manufacturing facilities locally. Further, even in 
developed nations where there is much patent fetish, such as the United 
States, the astronomical cost of medication has resulted in an increased 
appreciation for the role of generics. Thus, generics are viewed as an 
important component to enable market competition, to challenge bad 
patents, and to provide access to medication. Developing countries such 
as India and Brazil should not back pedal into limiting the generic 
manufacturers without having a clear roadmap to provide alternative 
access to medication, which it lacks now. 
Free Trade Agreements with other countries, the United States tends to prefer definitions that interpret 
Article 39 more stringently in a manner requiring a much higher data protection requirement. 
 132.  See Maria Phelan & Catherine Cook, A Treatment Revolution for Those Who can Afford 
it? Hepatitis C Treatment: New Medications, Profits and Patients, BMC INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
(2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4178584/ [https://perma.cc/HCF5-RFPS] 
(discussing how the company allowed some countries to make these new medicines available at cost 
for their populations or appreciable discounts); see also Winnie de Bruijn et al., Introduction and 
Utilization of High Priced HCV Medicines across Europe; Implications for the Future, 7 FRONTIERS 
IN PHARMACOLOGY (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27516740 
[https://perma.cc/V38K-Q8J8]; see also Srividhya Ragavan, Patients Win Over Patents, THE HINDU 
(Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/patients-win-over-
patents/article4482469.ece [https://perma.cc/SLZ6-D7XS]; see generally, Ragavan & Dave, The 
Right Prescription to the IPR Debate, HINDUSTAN TIMES, (Sept. 29, 2014), 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/ht-view/the-right-prescription-in-the-ipr-debate/story-
aEvB8EGLIsoweSdpozDwBI.html [https://perma.cc/5PNN-SVA9].  
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